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Abstract 
This paper presents previously unpublished descriptive structural data 
for the grain barging industry. Structural parameters are examined to com-
pare the structure of the industry to the purely competitive model. The re-
sults indicate a trend away from the purely competitive model, which could 
affect analyses of various waterway user charge schemes. 
STRUCT1JRE OF THE GRAIN BARGING INDUSTRY 
Prior to the development of overland modes of commercial transpor-
tation most freight carriage within the United States took place by 
water. Even though rail, motor truck, and pipeline now carry the 
major portion of intercity freight traffic in the United States, 
water transportation has not been entirely replaced. In 1975, in-
land waterway carriage amounted to 243 billion ton miles or slightly 
more than 10 percent of total intercity freight. 
Inland water transportation has recently come under close 
scrutiny by the Executive Branch of the Federal Government and by 
legislative committees of Congress. This scrutiny has therefore 
also activated special interest groups. Even though triggered by 
such local controversies as reconstruction of the Mississippi River 
Lock and Dam 26, the major underlying issue has been whether the users 
of inland waterways should bear a substantial part or all of the cost 
of improving and maintaining publicly provided waterways. The pri-
mary point of contention has been the incidence of various proposed 
user charges. But definitive research has been hampered by lack of 
information specific to the subdivisions of the bargin~ industry. 
The purpose of this paper is to present structural data for the 
grain barging industry. The data were collected in the research 
phase of the author's dissertation and have not been published up to 
this point in time. The original data collection effort was under-
taken to test the usual assumption that the grain barging industry 
is purely competitive. 
Evidence of aoderate Departure from Perfect Col'lpetition 
The grain barging industry is a separate and unique part of 
inland waterway transportation. The uniqueness stems from the regu-
latory exemption of grain barge shipments, tne specialized nature of 
the barge firms serving the grain trade, and the type of rate deter-
mination procedure used in the industry. In most studies the 
assumption has been that the grain barging industry is purely com-
petitive. Authors of transportation textbooks such as Pegrum, 
Locklin, and Kneafsey, treat the inland water transportation industry 
as being very competitive compared with other modes; most authors 
would agree with Pegrum in concluding that " ••• costs are mostly 
variable, and the industry is therefore highly competitive" (Pegrum, 
p. 180). 
Preliminary discussions with barge firm managers indicated that 
recent changes in the grain barging industry may have affected the 
competitive nature of the industry. Periodic overbuilding of the 
grain barge fleet, a shift to the use of long term contracts for 
barge services, and entry into the grain barge industry by grain 
shippers were some of the specific occurrences cited. 
In accordance with the Bainsian structure, conduct, and per-
formance technique, important structural variables bearing on the 
competitive nature of tne grain barging industry are seller concen-
tration, product differentiation, barriers to entry, and vertical 
integration. That structural variables such as these can have a 
potentially significant effect on the decision-making latitude of 
firm managers is now widely accepted in market structure literature. 
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Data for the structural study of grain barging came from the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers and personal interviews with managers of barge 
firms and grain shippers. The data not only bear on the structural 
issue that was paramount, but constitute a (partial) information base 
that was previously unavailable. The data are generally descriptive 
of the grain barging industry and pinpoint changes in structure that 
have occurred in the past few years. 
Seller Concentration 
According to Corps of Engineers data for 1975, approximately 1,850 
firms owning over 20,000 barges provide waterborne transportation 
services on inland waterways. Of the 1,850 firms only 956 operate on 
the ~lississippi River System and not all of these tow grain barges. 
Some direct their operations toward movement of a specific non-grain 
commodity such as coal or petroleum. Many firms specialize in a 
supportive operation such as switching, fleeting, mid-stream refueling, 
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or dredging. Although any firm owning a large towboat could push grain 
tows, personal interviews by the author with industry personnel suggest 
that regular line haul carriers of grain on the Mississippi River 
System number no more than 25. 
The size of firms in an industry can be expressed in terms such 
as number of employees or sales. Neither of these statistics is readily 
available for individual firms in the grain barging industry. On the 
other hand, it is common in the barge industry to rank firms by number 
of barges owned. 
Industry sources provided a list of thirty-five firms owning 
covered barges used in the grain trade. Twenty-five of these own line 
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haul towboats. Ten, mostly grain shippers, do not. Corps of Engineers 
data indicate that between 1970 and 1977 the total count of grain 
barges nearly doubled (see Table 1). Barges were added rather rapidly 
during the early 1970's, when grain exports to the U.S.S.R. and other 
countries increased so fast. Fewer barges have been added annually 
since 1974. 
Conforming to the customary analytical format of showing the 
number and size distribution of firms in the industry and the concen-
tration ratio (Caves, p. 8), Table 2 presents the size distribution of 
firms owning grain barges on January 1, 1977. Although several firms 
own relatively large numbers of barges, well over half the firms could 
be described as middle-sized, owning 100 to 300 barges. 
Converted to 4-firm, 8-firm, and 20-firm concentration ratios, 
the data show only moderately high concentration at the 4-firm level 
but fairly high concentration at the 20-firm level. The ratios for 
1977 indicate declining 4-firm concentration. The data for the two 
years are as follows: 
January 1, 1977 
January 1, 1972 
Total Number 
of Companies 
35 
31 
Percentage of 
Total Number of Barges Owned By: 
Largest 4 Largest 8 Largest 20 
28.6 45.6 82.6 
44.5 57.7 72.3 
Based on degree of concentration, as of 1977 the grain barging 
industry was a type II oligopoly and nearly met the criteria for class-
ification as type I oligopoly, in which the largest eight firms are 
responsible for at least 50 percent of industry output and the largest 
twenty firms at least 75 percent (Caves, p. 11). 
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Table 1 Covered Barges Available to the Grain Trade, 1970-1977 
Percent Change 
Year Number of Barges from Previous Year 
1970 4074 
1971 4329 6.3 
1972 4762 10.0 
1973 5464 14.6 
1974 6121 12.0 
1975 6452 5.4 
1976 6819 5·7 
1977 7344 5·7 
Sourcea Enumeration obtained from Transportation Lines on 
the Mississippi River System published annually by the u.s. Army 
Corps of Engineers. 
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Table 2 Ownership Size Distribution for Covered Barges, among 
Grain Barging Firms Operating on the Mississippi River, 
January 1, 1977 
Number of Barges Number of Firms 
0 
- 19 1 
20 
- 49 5 
so - 99 3 
100 - 199 10 
200 
- 299 9 
300 - 399 4 
400 
- 499 1 
500 - 599 1 
600 - 699 
..1 
TOTAL 3.5 
Product Differentiation 
Product differentiation exists when a buyer can form a preference 
for the product of a particular firm within an industry based on real 
or imagined differences in the firm's product compared with similar 
products of other firms. As a single criterion the physical char-
acteristics of barges allow no product differentiation. All dry 
covered cargo barges used in the grain trade are built to the same 
physical specifications. 
However, the product of a grain barging firm is more than the 
physical features of a barge. The product is the total package of 
services involved in moving a cargo of grain from origin to destin-
ation. This includes the barge space, towing, switching, fleeting, 
and other features such as cargo insurance, demurrage penalties, and 
terms of payment. In spite of possible variations which occasionally 
occur, contracts for barge services have been standardized in line 
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with the terms specified in Bulk Grain Tariff No. 7, which the Waterways 
Freight Bureau filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission on behalf 
of grain barging firms. Even though the Tariff has officially been 
cancelled, carriers still generally adhere to its terms. 
In trying to differentiate their particular package of services, 
some barge firms have built reputations for consistently providing 
reliable service. A barge firm that establishes a good reputation with 
shippers is able to reduce the substitutability with services of a firm 
having a poor record. Even so, there is little basis for concluding 
that the degree of product differentiation would allow one firm to charge 
a substantially higher price for its services than other barge firms. 
Barriers to Entry 
Product differentiation is commonly cited as a barrier to entry. 
Product differentiation allows established firms some flexibility in 
administering prices based on difficult to duplicate product features. 
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Differentiation in the grain barging industry takes the form of 
firm differentiation rather than product differentiation. Firm differ-
entiation, even when little or no product differentiation exists, can 
give a firm an advantage in the marketplace compared to competitors and 
potential entrants. Longstanding favorable relationships with customers 
may enable a firm to charge slightly higher prices than existing or 
potential competitors. At very leastp the firm may be granted first 
chance at the opportunity to supply all or a part of a customer's 
future needs. Little evidence was found to indicate that individual 
firms providing grain barging services can consistently charge higher 
prices tnan competitors, but it is common for grain shippers to refer 
most of their barging business to a preferred carrier. This alone can 
be an advantage for an established firm relative to an actual or 
potential new one. 
Economics of size can become a formidable barrier to entry in 
those industries in which it is possible for a firm to reach a very 
large size in terms of the total market before achieving the lowest per 
unit production cost. A potential entrant has limited alternatives 
when faced with such a situation. If he enters at such a scale that he 
too can achieve the lowest per unit production cost, he may create an 
over-supply situation. As a second alternative, the new entrant may 
enter the industry at a rather small size to avoid disturbing the 
market, but then would have a cost disadvantage relative to the largest 
firms in the industry. 
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Charles Howe examined the economies stemming from increased firm 
size in inland water transportation. He concludes " ••• firms can increase 
their technical efficiency as the size of their operations increase and 
by being provided with a deeper and less congested waterway 11 (p. 42). 
Desalvo and Case separately refined and extended Howe's work (Shabman, 
p. 36). Their findings tended to support Howe's. Even so, the evidence 
suggests tnat economies of firm size are rather modest and do not re-
present a major barrier to entry. 
Regulatory barriers to entry are virtually non-existent for the 
grain barging industry. Because grain is one of the dry, bulk commodities 
exempt from Interstate Commerce Commission (I.C.C.) regulation, potential 
entrants do not need I.C.C. approval for entry. However, once it is a 
part of the industry, a firm must conduct its grain barging operations 
in such a manner that commodities shipped satisfy I.C.C. conditions for 
exemption as set forth in the Interstate Commerce Act of 1940. 
Barriers to entry presented little problem during the period 1972 
to 1977 as evidenced by the entry of five firms. One of the firms 
entering was a water carrier which transported no grain prior to the 
period examined. Four of the new entrants were grain companies which 
purchased barges. Although its action did nothing to change the number 
of firms in the grain barging industry, a large grain company acquired 
an existing barge firm during the period 1972 to 1977. One firm left 
the industry during the period. 
Vertical Integration 
Wnere number, size, degree of product differentiation, and con-
ditions of entry explain horizontal relationships in an industry, the 
degree of vertical integration as a structural variable describes 
vertical relationships. Vertical integration occurs when an estab-
lisned firm acquires control over successive stages in the production-
marketing sequence. 
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Vertical coordination in the grain barging industry has tended to 
shift from market exchange and negotiated contracts to direct ownership. 
The expansion in barge numbers in the early 1970s was due in large part 
to grain company purchases of barges. Grain firms increased their 
ownership share of the total number of grain barges from 25 percent in 
1972 to 40 percent in 1977 (Woolverton, p. 61). Several grain companies 
have acquired barge firms. 
Vertical integration by grain firms into barge ownership or barge 
line operation has occurred for several reasons. In the early 1970s 
sharply increased grain exports coupled with a relatively fixed supply 
of grain barges caused barge rates to increase without an accompanying 
rapid increase in barge space. Purchasing barges or a barge firm 
assured a grain shipper of the means to transport grain to export and 
inland water terminals. In the mid-1970s, as the size of the barge 
fleet grew, periodic downturns in grain export volume caused barge rates 
to fall drastically. Integration into barging by grain firms during a 
time of widely fluctuating barge prices tended to reduce the uncertainty 
of merchandising profits by internalizing barging costs. 
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Diversified grain companies that also trade in commodities other 
than grain have an additional incentive to integrate into the grain 
barging industry. Non-grain commodities such as fertilizer make con-
venient backhauls for export grain shipments since they too must be 
transported in covered barges. By coordinating commodity movements 
internally, a diversified firm can achieve a nigh degree of barge 
equipment utilization, thus lowering per ton transportation cost. 
Summary and Concluding Remarks 
This paper has presented updated descriptive structural data for 
the grain barging industry. The grain barging industry is one of a 
relatively few number of firms. Concentration ratios based on the 
number of grain barges owned by each firm indicate that market concen-
tration in the industry has declined slightly in the past five years 
but still is high enough to classify the industry as oligopolistic 
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rather than purely competitive. On the other hand, lack of product 
differentiation and relatively low barriers to entry have helped main-
tain the competitive nature of the grain barging industry. 
A significant finding was the trend toward vertical integration. 
Some of the recent industry entrants have been grain shippers which 
leased and purchased grain barges or acquired grain barging firms. 
They apparently did so in an attempt to gain greater vertical control 
of their operations. 
The findings tend to refute the usual assumption that the grain 
barging industry is purely competitive. Investigation verified the 
casual observations of barge firm managers that recent industry struc-
tural changes have occurred in the industry. This led to a conclusion 
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that trends in the structure of the barge industry push it in a direc-
tion away from the perfectly competitive model. 
The findings may consti.tute an analytical base useful for public 
and private decision making. For example, the type of inland waterway 
user charge imposed takes on greater importance in an imperfectly com-
petitive industry compared to an industry that can be classified as 
purely competitive. The impact of various user charge schemes on price, 
quantity of services offered, intermodal competition, relative advan-
tages among regions, and other distributional burdens must be viewed 
in a different light. 
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